COMMENT
Protecting the Good-Faith Tenant: Enforcing Retaliatory
Eviction Laws by Broadening the Residential Tenant’s
Options in Summary Eviction Courts
I. Introduction
Summary eviction courts were created to protect both the landlord’s interest
in freely controlling the use of her residential property and the tenant’s interest
in security of tenure.1 Yet tenants, who often appear pro se in summary
eviction proceedings, are rarely able to articulate the valid defense of
retaliatory eviction.2 Furthermore, studies show that tenants are likely to lose
in eviction courts, regardless of whether they present a defense or not.3 Given
this situation, tenants who have undertaken a protected action—such as
reporting violations of building codes—and who have a legitimate fear that
their landlord may act in a retaliatory manner should be allowed to instigate
preliminary injunction actions in summary eviction courts to enjoin landlords
from evicting them. If a tenant facing probable retaliatory eviction could bring
a preliminary injunction action against a landlord’s illegal retaliation in
summary eviction court, the tenant would have more control over his
appearance in eviction court, thereby promoting the policies underlying
retaliatory eviction laws.
This comment proposes and outlines a summary preliminary injunction
procedure that would further protect tenants from retaliatory eviction in
response to their good-faith efforts to improve their living conditions, while
balancing landlords’ rights to property and free operation of business. The
adoption of the summary preliminary injunction procedure would allow
tenants the right to bring an action in summary eviction courts—a course of
action wholly new to the summary eviction process. Such a change would
1. See discussion infra Part II.A.
2. See REBECCA HALL, BERKELEY CMTY. LAW C TR., EVICTION PREVENTION AS
HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION 2, 9-11 (1991); LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUSING, NO TIME
FOR JUSTICE: A STUDY OF CHICAGO’S EVICTION COURT 13, 15-16 (2003) [hereinafter NO TIME
FOR JUSTICE], available at http://www.lcbh.org/images/2008/10/chicago-eviction-courtstudy.pdf.
3. See N O T IME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, 16-18; see also Leslie Wolf Branscomb &
Tanya Sierra, Landlord of Opportunity: National City Mayor’s Units Have Made Him Millions
While Tenants Fight Vermin, Disrepair, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 15, 2005, at A1
(reporting that 95% of pro se tenants lose their cases, according to Steven Kellman, director of
the Tenants’ Legal Center of San Diego), available at 2005 WLNR 20378746.
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enhance tenants’ ability to avail themselves of the protections provided by
anti-retaliatory eviction laws.
Yet the introduction of the summary
preliminary injunction procedure also creates the need for specific safeguards
to protect landlords from tenants abusing the summary preliminary injunction
action.
Most landlords seek evictions in good faith. It has been recognized that
“the great majority of [landlords] are merely attempting to earn a reasonable
return on their investments by providing a vital service to our society.”4 The
vast majority of eviction proceedings are filed for nonpayment of rent,5 which
is generally recognized as a valid cause for eviction.6 The procedure proposed
in this comment, therefore, should not have any detrimental effect on
landlords’ good-faith efforts to protect their legal interests within the summary
eviction courts. Additionally, the proposed procedure is narrowly aimed to
protect tenants who have already been subject to threats of retaliatory eviction,
or who have good cause to suspect that their landlords may retaliate in
response to protected actions taken in good faith. The procedure would allow
tenants to bring preliminary injunction actions to prohibit the landlords’
retaliatory evictions.
This comment begins in Part II by presenting the development and basic
elements of the summary eviction procedure and by summarizing the
fundamental steps of the typical summary eviction process. Parts III and IV
discuss the inception and evolution of tenant protections guaranteed by
retaliatory eviction law and analyze the policies behind the prohibition of
retaliatory action by landlords. Part V demonstrates that tenants are often
unable to benefit from the important protections offered by retaliatory eviction
laws. Part VI details the proposed preliminary injunction procedure, and Part
VII responds to potential arguments of opponents to the procedure. This
comment concludes in Part VIII.

4. Laura L. Westray, Note, Are Landlords Being Taken by the Good Cause Eviction
Requirement?, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 321, 321 (1988).
5. See N O T IME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 6; A System in Collapse: Baltimore City
Suffers from an Overwhelmingly High Caseload of Tenant Evictions. Hurt in the Process Are
Tenants, Landlords, the City of Baltimore, and Its Neighborhoods, ABELL REP., Mar. 2003, at
1, 2 [hereinafter A System in Collapse], available at http://www.abell.org/pubsitems/arn303.pdf.
6. See, e.g., UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(c) (1972) (listing
exceptions to the prohibition against landlord retaliatory evictions). Building or housing code
violations “caused primarily by lack of reasonable care of the tenant” constitute another
exception to the retaliatory eviction prohibition, as does any circumstance in which “compliance
with the applicable building or housing code requires alteration, remodeling, or demolition
which would effectively deprive the tenant of use of the dwelling unit.” Id.
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II. The Summary Eviction Process
A. Development of and Reasoning Behind the Summary Eviction Process
For much of common law history, landlords were allowed to personally
evict their tenants in a process referred to as landlord “self-help.”7
Unfortunately, landlord self-help posed significant risks of violent landlordtenant conflict and wrongful eviction of the tenant.8 One alternative to
landlord self-help was the legal remedy of ejectment; however, the ejectment
process was “a relatively slow, fairly complex, and substantially expensive
procedure” that proved impractical for timely effectuating the interest of the
landlord in regaining control of her property.9 Thus, both alternatives open to
landlords for evicting tenants were unsavory.
Legislatures responded to this situation by creating the summary eviction
process, which was intended “to avoid the negative effects of self-help, yet
simultaneously ensure the health of the rental market by expeditiously
removing tenants who do not meet market expectations.”10 The summary
eviction process thus represents an efficient method of enforcing forcible entry
and detainer (FED) statutes.11 Generally, FED statutes made landlord self-help
illegal and required evictions be conducted through the summary eviction
process.12 The summary eviction process was therefore intended to balance
the interests of the tenant in not being abruptly, violently, or wrongfully
evicted—as tended to occur in self-help evictions—with the interests of the
landlord in a more efficient and less cumbersome procedure than ejectment.13

7. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972); Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights,
Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135,
150-52 (2000).
8. See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 71; N O TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 6; Randy G.
Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and
More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 776 (1994).
9. See Gerchick, supra note 8, at 776 (explaining that “ejectment statutes required the
landlord to prove she held title to the disputed land,” which involved the difficult burden of
“show[ing] title superior not only to the tenant’s, but also to everyone else’s”).
10. See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 6.
11. See Spector, supra note 7, at 152-60.
12. Gerchick, supra note 8, at 776-77 (noting that “[t]he majority of states . . . forbid a
landlord from using any form of self-help and require the landlord to resort to the judicial
remedy in evicting a tenant”).
13. See id.
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B. The Summary Eviction Process
Today, summary eviction procedures vary from state to state—and
sometimes even within states, depending on local municipality rules.14
Nevertheless, the core requirements and steps are substantially similar across
jurisdictions.15 There are two major phases of the summary eviction process.
First, a court must “determin[e] which party is entitled to possession” of the
property.16 Second, a sheriff or marshal will conduct the actual eviction, if the
court grants a writ of possession to the landlord.17 Since a preliminary
injunction against retaliatory eviction would necessarily occur before the
second stage of the summary eviction process, this analysis will focus on the
first phase of the summary eviction process.
Phase one of the summary eviction process generally entails several steps
that lead to the adjudication of the right to possession. First, the landlord must
notify the tenant that she is seeking possession of the rental unit and state the
reasons for doing so.18 If the tenant fails to adequately address the landlord’s
concerns within a certain time following receipt of notice, then “the landlord
may file a summary eviction claim.”19 Much like any civil action, the landlord
must serve the tenant with copies of the summons and complaint.20 Typically,
the tenant then has between two and five days to respond.21 The tenant’s
failure to timely answer the complaint authorizes the landlord to request a writ
of possession by default.22 If the tenant responds in a timely fashion, on the
other hand, the action will proceed to trial,23 where the landlord must prevail
in order to obtain a writ of possession.24
While the timeline of the summary eviction procedure varies among
jurisdictions, it is important to note that the summary eviction process is
deliberately streamlined.25 In most jurisdictions, the time period that elapses
14. See id. at 791.
15. See id. at 791-92; see also Spector, supra note 7, at 137, 160-62 (observing that all
states have some form of summary eviction proceedings in place, and that the U.S. Supreme
Court has “effectively eliminated any incentive for change to the summary procedure for
eviction” with its decision in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)).
16. See Gerchick, supra note 8, at 792.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 791; see also NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 6.
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between the landlord’s initial provision of notice to the tenant and the
landlord’s receipt of a writ of possession falls between a few days, if the tenant
fails to appear, and a few weeks, if the tenant contests the eviction.26
III. Retaliatory Eviction Law
A. Retaliatory Eviction: Definition and Relevance
Generally, retaliatory eviction occurs when a landlord seeks to evict a tenant
after the tenant has taken some legally protected action, in connection with the
rental property, that the landlord perceives to be contrary to her interests.27
Tenant actions most frequently retaliated against, and therefore most
commonly protected from retaliatory action, include (1) reporting of any
housing code violation that materially affects health and safety to a supervising
governmental agency with the power to enforce the housing code against
landlords;28 (2) complaining to the landlord for the landlord’s failure to
maintain the premises;29 and (3) forming or joining a tenant’s union or other
tenants’ rights advocacy group.30 These actions are specifically protected by
statute and/or common law because of the policies underlying the adoption of
retaliatory eviction laws.31 Therefore, a tenant usually must prove that he
undertook a protected action in order to successfully assert a claim or defense
of retaliatory eviction.32
26. The exact length of any actual summary eviction action may vary depending on the
circumstances, but “[e]ven with delays, most evictions can be accomplished in two to three
months.” Kathleen Doler, Evictions Are Hard: How to Do Them If Rent Romance Ends,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Nov. 24, 2006, at A9; see also Spector, supra note 7, at 137 (noting
that summary eviction cases are usually completed “within six to ten days after the action is
commenced”).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8 (1977).
28. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(a)(1) (1972). In Markese
v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County Ct. 1972), a county court in New York recognized
that retaliatory eviction occurs when the landlord “evicts his tenant because of the tenant’s
reporting of housing code violations to the public authorities.” Id. at 65.
29. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(a)(2). For a recent and
humorous example of an alleged retaliatory eviction falling within this category, see Julie
Harding, Tenant’s Anger at Eviction Note, BRISTOL EVENING P OST , Apr. 26, 2008, at 12 (“A
blind man claims he is being evicted from his rented Bristol flat because he asked when the
landlord would redecorate the property.”).
30. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101(a)(3). In Hillview
Associates v. Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d 867 (Iowa 1989), the Iowa Supreme Court held that the
landlord of a mobile home park had retaliated against tenants for their active participation in
a tenants’ association. See id. at 871-72.
31. See discussion infra Part III.C.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8(4); see also
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Courts may find wrongful retaliatory action taken by the landlord even
when an actual eviction did not occur. If the landlord takes action she knows
will have the effect of forcing the tenant to leave, that action can violate
retaliatory eviction laws.33 Thus, retaliatory action may be prohibited by
statute where, for example, the landlord substantially alters the terms of the
lease for the purpose of forcing the tenant to leave.34 A California appellate
court has recognized raising rent beyond the reasonable value of the rental unit
or beyond what the landlord knows the tenant can afford as precisely this sort
of an illegal retaliation.35 Similarly, a landlord’s refusal to renew a tenant’s
lease in response to a tenant’s protected action has also been found to
constitute unlawful retaliation.36
There have been few studies indicating the frequency with which retaliatory
eviction occurs. Two primary causes contribute to the lack of statistics on
retaliatory evictions. First, studies show that many tenants appear as pro se
defendants in summary eviction courts.37 Tenants in this situation are often
unable to effectively present any defense, including a retaliatory eviction
defense, even when such a defense might be warranted and successful.38
Second, there is no way to account for the number of tenants who are the
victims of retaliatory evictions but choose not to contest the evictions for
personal or financial reasons or out of fear.39 As a result of both of these
circumstances, very few records exist from which to determine the frequency
of retaliatory evictions.
Despite the lack of definite statistics on the frequency of retaliatory eviction
today, news articles from the past few years demonstrate that retaliatory
eviction is an issue that courts continue to encounter across the country.40 For
discussion infra Part VI.A.2.
33. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.310(a) (2000); Aweeka v. Bonds, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650,
651-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (finding that raising rent when the landlord was aware of the
tenant’s inability to pay constituted grounds for an independent retaliatory eviction action by
the tenant).
34. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:42-10.10(d) (West 2010).
35. See Aweeka, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52.
36. See, e.g., McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1125, 1132 (D. Mass. 1970), aff’d,
438 F.2d 781, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) (invalidating a lease provision purporting to grant the landlord
the unconditional right to refuse renewal); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:
LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8.
37. See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 13; Gerchick, supra note 8, at 794-95; see
also Branscomb & Sierra, supra note 3.
38. NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 15-16.
39. See Gerchick, supra note 8, at 794-95.
40. See, e.g., Marian Gail Brown, Landlord/Tenant Dispute Gets Personal, CONN. POST,
Apr. 13, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 6926559; Cynthia Di Pasquale, The Tenants’ Voice
in Annapolis, Times Nine, DAILY R EC. (Balt.), June 30, 2006, at 4, available at 2006 WLNR
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example, a landlord in Baltimore, Maryland, attempted to evict a tenant in
retaliation for her refusal to sign a lease addendum that assigned to her
responsibility for any mold found in the rental unit.41 In Madison, Wisconsin,
a landlord’s retaliatory eviction of a woman who joined a neighborhood-watch
program prompted the Madison City Council to pass anti-retaliatory eviction
legislation in 2007.42 Also in 2007, residents of one apartment complex in a
Los Angeles suburb brought suit against their landlord, claiming that the
apartment complex owner unreasonably raised rent in retaliation for their
complaints to the city government about illegal eviction notices and the
landlord’s failure to provide tenants with statutorily required protections
during renovation work that rendered units uninhabitable.43 Thus, despite the
proliferation of protections afforded tenants against retaliatory evictions over
the past three decades,44 retaliatory evictions continue to impact tenants today.
B. Development of Retaliatory Eviction Law
1. Common Law Retaliatory Eviction
Traditionally, the common law considered landlords privileged to possess
their own lands essentially at will, and as a result, “the common law made no
inquiry into [a landlord’s] purpose or motives” with respect to actions
affecting the landlord-tenant relationship.45 Prior to the D.C. Circuit’s
groundbreaking decision regarding retaliatory eviction in Edwards v. Habib,
the common law provided “that a private landlord was not required . . . to give
a reason for evicting a month-to-month tenant and was free to do so for any
reason or for no reason at all.”46
24353811; Alex Dobuzinskis, Complex’s Landlord Faces Charges, Glendale Joins Residents
in Criminal Complaint, DAILY NEWS (L.A.), Oct. 5, 2007, at N3, available at 2007 WLNR
19725510; Mary Yeater Rathbun, Council Hikes Renters’ Rights; Bans Retaliation by
Landlords, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Oct. 3, 2007, at A2, available at 2007 WLNR
19409458.
41. See Di Pasquale, supra note 40.
42. See Rathbun, supra note 40.
43. See Dobuzinskis, supra note 40.
44. See discussion infra Part III.B.
45. Annotation, Retaliatory Eviction of Tenant for Reporting Landlord’s Violation of Law,
23 A.L.R.5TH 140, § 2[a] (1994).
46. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (citing, inter alia, Warthen v.
Lamas, 43 A.2d 759 (D.C. 1945)); accord Markese v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 66 (Monroe
County Ct. 1972). Under the laws of some jurisdictions with statutory prohibitions on
retaliatory eviction, month-to-month tenants remain more vulnerable to eviction for wrongful
purposes than fixed-term tenants. See generally Mark S. Dennison, Tenant’s Rights and
Remedies Against Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord, 45 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 375, § 7
(1998) [hereinafter Dennison, Tenant’s Rights] (discussing variations among jurisdictions in the
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Retaliatory eviction was first legitimized as an affirmative defense to an
FED or eviction claim in 1968 in Edwards v. Habib.47 In Edwards, tenant
Yvonne Edwards complained to the D.C. Department of Licenses and
Inspections about sanitary code violations on the residential property she
rented from landlord Nathan Habib.48 Upon discovering more than forty code
violations during the resulting investigation, the department ordered Habib to
correct the situation.49 Habib then gave Edwards notice to vacate.50 While the
Edwards court recognized that the constitutional protections of free speech and
equal protection could provide a basis for prohibiting retaliatory eviction,51 it
declined to decide the case on constitutional grounds and instead decided the
issue based on the public policy expressed in legislative codes governing
living conditions.52
The legislative policy relied on by the court in Edwards as the basis for its
adoption of anti-retaliatory eviction measures was expressed in the legislative
enactment of housing and sanitary codes.53 The Edwards court noted that such
applicability of retaliatory eviction statutes to fixed-term versus month-to-month leases).
Whether the retaliatory eviction laws apply with equal force to both month-to-month tenants
and tenants “holding over” from expired fixed-term leases is typically determined by the
wording of the applicable anti-retaliatory eviction statute. See id.
47. See 397 F.2d 687.
48. Id. at 688.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 689.
51. See id. at 690-98. Generally, the tenant’s argument for protection under the United
States Constitution is that the state’s inaction against a landlord who evicts a tenant who has not
violated his lease, but who has made a good-faith complaint to authorities regarding living
conditions in rented property, constitutes an abridgment of free speech or equal protection. See
id.
52. See id. at 696, 699-701. Other courts have likewise recognized that retaliatory eviction
cases often involve constitutional issues but have declined to decide cases on that basis. E.g.,
Markese v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 71 (Monroe County Ct. 1972); Dickhut v. Norton, 173
N.W.2d 297, 299 (Wis. 1970). But see LaVoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 11-14 (1st Cir. 1972)
(finding in favor of the tenant on a § 1983 claim brought on First and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds); Walton v. Darby Town Houses, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 553, 557-60 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(same); see also David Thomas, Note, Landlord-Tenant: The Status of Retaliatory Conduct in
Oklahoma, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 159, 167 (1980) (noting that some courts that have decided the
issue of retaliatory eviction on constitutional grounds “have proscribed retaliatory conduct on
the basis of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act
of 1871”).
53. See Edwards, 397 F.2d at 700-01; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:
LANDLORD & T ENANT § 14.8(1) (1977) (requiring “a protective housing statute embodying a
public purpose to insure proper conditions of housing, especially multi-unit housing designed
for rental to tenants of low or moderate income,” as an essential element for establishing a claim
of retaliatory eviction). For an in-depth discussion of the purposes and policies underlying
retaliatory eviction laws, including the policy generally adopted by legislatures in housing,
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codes “indicate a strong and pervasive [legislative] concern to secure for the
city’s slum dwellers decent, or at least safe and sanitary, places to live.”54
Since the successful operation of such codes depends in part on the tenants’
active reporting of violations, it would frustrate these codes’ fundamental,
remedial purpose to allow landlords to thwart the tenants’ reporting of code
violations by taking retaliatory action.55 Courts therefore view the legislative
intent expressed in such codes as a proper legal basis for judicial recognition
of a defense of retaliatory eviction.56
In fact, some courts even go so far as extrapolate from the enactment of
housing codes a legislative intent to “impose an implied warranty of
habitability on the landlord.”57 The implied warranty of habitability basically
means that the landlord guarantees, from the inception and for the duration of
the lease, that there are and will be no latent defects in the property that
materially affect health and safety.58 Courts have determined that the implied
warranty of habitability is the legal construct that authorizes the retaliatory
eviction defense: without such defense, the underlying purpose of the implied
warranty of habitability would be frustrated by evictions carried out in
retaliation for a tenant’s good-faith activism to improve his apartment’s
habitability.59 In short, judicially established prohibitions on retaliatory
eviction result from courts construing applicable housing codes as legislative
expressions of public policy in favor of safe and healthy living conditions.

sanitary, and building codes, see discussion infra Part III.C.
54. Edwards, 397 F.2d at 700; accord Dickhut, 173 N.W.2d at 299 (“There can be no doubt
that the legislature and the common council of the city of Milwaukee have both recognized that
blighted, substandard and insanitary housing conditions do exist and that they are detrimental
to the public interest.”)
55. Edwards, 397 F.2d at 700-01; accord Wright v. Brady, 889 P.2d 105, 107-09 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing the significance of the policies underlying local housing codes);
Clore v. Fredman, 319 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ill. 1974) (“The public policy of this State as evidenced
by its statutory law forbids a landlord to terminate or refuse to renew a lease because a tenant
complained to a governmental authority of a bona fide violation of any applicable building
code, health ordinance or similar regulation.”); Markese, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 67-69; Dickhut, 173
N.W.2d at 298-301.
56. See Edwards, 397 F.2d at 701. For a comprehensive jurisdictional analysis of judicial
adoption of retaliatory eviction as an affirmative defense, see Mark S. Dennison, Retaliatory
Eviction Claims, 99 AM. JUR. TRIALS 289, § 2 (2006) [hereinafter Dennison, Eviction Claims].
57. See Dennison, Eviction Claims, supra note 56, § 2; see also Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d
791, 793-97 (Iowa 1972).
58. Dennison, Eviction Claims, supra note 56, § 2.
59. See id.
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2. Statutory Retaliatory Eviction
Statutory recognition of the retaliatory eviction defense followed judicial
acceptance of the doctrine. In 1972, four years after the Edwards decision and
on the heels of similar decisions from other courts across the nation,60 the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated
the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA), which adopted
in statutory form the defense of retaliatory eviction.61 URLTA Article V,
entitled “Retaliatory Conduct,” has been expressly adopted by fifteen states.62
In total, thirty-six jurisdictions have adopted statutory protections against
retaliatory evictions.63 Additionally, countless municipalities have enacted
anti-retaliatory eviction ordinances.64
The two types of retaliatory eviction prohibitions, common law and
statutory, have led to variations in the array of retaliatory eviction protections
available to tenants in different jurisdictions. Among the jurisdictions
affording any such protections to tenants, some have prohibitions based in
both common and statutory law, while others have only one form of
prohibition.65
C. General Policies Underlying Retaliatory Eviction Laws
There are three primary policies underlying the prohibition of retaliatory
eviction: (1) improving public health, housing, and living conditions; (2)
promoting social stability; and (3) reducing the cost of eviction to
governments.
1. Improvement of Public Health, Housing, and Living Conditions
The improvement of public health, housing, and living conditions is the
primary policy set forth by both courts and legislatures in adopting
60. See, e.g., Schweiger v. Super. Ct. of Alameda County, 476 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1970);
Markese, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63; Dickhut, 173 N.W.2d 297.
61. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101 (1972).
62. See Dennison, Tenant’s Rights, supra note 46, § 3 n.37.
63. See Dennison, Eviction Claims, supra note 56, § 3 n.2.
64. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 5-12-150 (1990); see also Rathbun, supra note 40
(discussing the adoption of a retaliatory eviction ordinance by the city council of Madison,
Wisconsin).
65. Still other jurisdictions have yet to embrace retaliatory eviction law in any form. For
example, Oklahoma has declined to adopt any prohibitions regarding retaliatory eviction, either
judicially or legislatively. See Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 41 OKLA. STAT.
§§ 101-136 (2001) (offering no protections against retaliatory evictions); Schuminsky v. Field,
1980 OK 22, ¶ 23, 606 P.2d 1133, 1137 (expressly declining to address the issue of retaliatory
eviction because it had not been raised in the course of proceedings).
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prohibitions on retaliatory eviction. Courts recognize that timely reporting of
code violations must be encouraged to promote the successful enforcement of
housing, sanitary, and building codes.66 A landlord’s use of any retaliatory
measure to silence bona fide complaints about living conditions directly
conflicts with public policy favoring improvement of living conditions.67 The
court in Edwards noted that allowing the use of retaliatory measures to silence
tenants’ complaints would have the effect of “not only punish[ing] [the tenant]
for making a complaint . . . but also would stand as a warning to others that
they dare not be so bold”—an outcome which would be patently at odds with
the applicable housing code legislation.68
2. Social Stability
The policy of social stability is primarily promoted in academic writings on
eviction, which focus on the potential social harms caused by the “involuntary
displacement” of tenants from their homes.69 Evictions can cause significant
disruption to an individual’s “educational, religious, social, and employment
connections,” as well as unnecessary economic loss and, in some cases, actual
homelessness.70 Such harms may create substantial social costs: additional
burdens on schools and social-welfare systems, increased vulnerability to
psychological distress, loss of community cohesiveness.71
Research and observation bear out the link between involuntary
displacement and these various harms. “Residential instability is a major
cause of school instability, which has grave consequences not only for the
transient students, but also for the ‘stable students in a classroom . . . .’”72 And
studies have found that the emotional and psychological harm involved with
the loss of a home can equal “the characteristics of grief and mourning for a
lost person.”73 Involuntary relocation can also cause an individual or family
66. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Markese v. Cooper,
333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 67 (Monroe County Ct. 1972); Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Wis.
1970); see also UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 5.101; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8 (1977).
67. See Markese, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
68. Edwards, 397 F.2d at 701.
69. See, e.g., Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law Protections
for Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 817, 821
(2008).
70. Id. at 821-23.
71. See id. at 828-29.
72. Id. at 821-22 (quoting Chester Hartman & Todd Michael Franke, Student Mobility:
How Some Children Get Left Behind, 72 J. NEGRO EDUC. 1, 1 (2003)).
73. Id. at 824 (quoting Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of
Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 377 (James Q.
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to be unjustifiably removed from a valuable and close-knit community. One
tenant facing eviction from a neighborhood of manufactured housing in which
she had lived for decades stated, “[T]his place is a community. . . . My
neighbors are like my family.”74 Finally, evictions may cause job disruption,75
if eviction forces a tenant to move so far away from her current job that
traveling to and from work becomes difficult or impossible.
3. Governmental Costs of Eviction
Successful illegal evictions may also place direct and indirect monetary
burdens on governments, forcing taxpayers to foot the bill.76 Municipalities
often must pay for expensive clean-up efforts to remove residential street
clutter left in the wake of wrongful evictions.77 Perhaps more importantly,
judicial enforcement of wrongful evictions makes inefficient use of
governmental time and resources, crowding the dockets of summary eviction
judges and consuming the availability of the sheriffs or marshals who must
execute a landlord’s writ of possession.78
Governments also suffer indirect costs of wrongful evictions: loss of tax
revenue and the economic burden of homelessness. As previously noted,
wrongful evictions can result in the unnecessary disruption of employment for
the evicted tenant.79 Such disruption obviously reduces or eliminates an
individual tenant’s income and thus constricts the government’s income- or
sales-tax revenue, placing strain on already-limited government resources.
Furthermore, for low-income tenants “living in tight housing markets,”
eviction may cause homelessness.80 Eviction proceedings, whether resulting
in eviction or not, create a unique susceptibility to homelessness, if the
unjustified eviction action subsequently appears on the tenant’s rental and/or
credit record, compromising the tenant’s ability to find subsequent housing.81
Wilson ed., 1966)).
74. Brown, supra note 40.
75. See Roisman, supra note 69, at 821; see also NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 6.
76. See Di Pasquale, supra note 40 (noting the waste of taxpayer funds as a result of
evictions in Baltimore, Maryland).
77. The City of Baltimore, for example, “spends $540,000 annually to clean up eviction
chattel” left in the streets. Di Pasquale, supra note 40 (reporting that Baltimore “has three
dedicated crews that clean up after roughly 32 evictions a day”).
78. See Gerchick, supra note 8, at 792 (detailing the summary eviction procedure).
79. See supra text accompanying note 75.
80. Roisman, supra note 69, at 823 (citing Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions:
The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 461, 468 (2003)).
81. See Robert R. Stauffer, Note, Tenant Blacklisting: Tenant Screening Services and the
Right to Privacy, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 239, 240-46 (1987) (describing how tenant screening
services compile tenant profiles, including rental histories); see also NO TIME FOR JUSTICE,
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Thus, at the same time that they cause decreases in government tax revenue,
illegal evictions indirectly increase costs to government and social-welfare
groups, by unjustifiably increasing the number of individuals requiring aid.82
The development and adoption of retaliatory eviction laws demonstrates
judicial and legislative intent to advance the underlying policies of promoting
public health, social stability, and economic efficiency. The importance of
anti-retaliatory eviction measures is underscored by a contrast with landlordtenant law in the United Kingdom. A recent article from the United Kingdom,
where landlords can exploit a “loophole” in the law to retaliate against
complaining renters, revealed that “[h]undreds of thousands of vulnerable
tenants are living in sub-standard housing because they fear being evicted if
they complain.”83 By contrast, many jurisdictions within the United States
have enacted laws prohibiting retaliatory eviction to prevent precisely that
situation.84 However, the protections afforded tenants by retaliatory eviction
laws are meaningless if tenants are unable to bring effective, timely defenses
or causes of action for retaliatory eviction, as is often the case in today’s
summary eviction courts.85
IV. Legal Developments Recognizing and Preserving Tenants’ Rights
Since the inception of retaliatory eviction laws, many courts and legislatures
have amended the summary eviction process in favor of tenants when existing
protections appeared insufficient. Courts and legislatures have established two
principal avenues by which a tenant may invoke the protections of retaliatory
eviction laws: an affirmative cause of action or a rebuttable presumption in the
tenant’s favor.
A. Allowing Tenants to Invoke Retaliatory Eviction Law Independently
First, courts and legislatures have expanded protections for tenants by
broadening the ways in which a tenant may invoke retaliatory eviction laws.
Although retaliatory eviction was originally cast as an affirmative defense in
supra note 2, at 6; A System in Collapse, supra note 5, at 1, 5.
82. See Roisman, supra note 69, at 828-29. The short- and long-term economic
consequences of homelessness on children must also be taken into account. For example, a
parent’s inability to provide housing puts children at greater risk of removal from the parent’s
custody and placement in foster care, which not only increases the need for immediate
government expenditures (direct payments to foster families) but can also jeopardize the longterm educational, psychological, social—and therefore economic—well-being of the children
torn from their families under such circumstances. See id. at 823, 828.
83. Eviction Fears Prevent Tenants Complaining, W. MAIL (UK), June 13, 2007, at 15.
84. See Dennison, Eviction Claims, supra note 56, § 3 n.2.
85. See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 15-16.
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Edwards and successor cases,86 courts in other jurisdictions quickly broadened
a tenant’s options to include the ability to raise the issue of retaliatory eviction.
Some courts have recognized that retaliatory eviction should be available to
tenant-defendants as a counterclaim in summary eviction proceedings.87 Other
courts have gone further. In Aweeka v. Bonds, for example, a California
appellate court recognized retaliatory eviction as an independent, affirmative
cause of action for damages outside the context of summary eviction courts.88
The Aweeka court stated,
We can discern no rational basis for allowing . . . a substantive
defense [of retaliatory eviction] while denying an affirmative cause
of action. It would be unfair and unreasonable to require a tenant,
subjected to a retaliatory rent increase by the landlord, to wait and
raise the matter as a defense only, after he is confronted with an
unlawful detainer action and a possible lien on his personal
property.89
Likewise, the court in Morford v. Lensey Corp. determined that damages could
be awarded as a remedy for a tenant who successfully proved a claim of
retaliatory eviction after the tenant was forced to vacate the premises.90
Still other courts have allowed tenants to bring preliminary injunction
actions in traditional civil courts. For example, in McQueen v. Druker, the
First Circuit upheld a decision enjoining a landlord from evicting a tenant in
a retaliatory manner after the landlord had served a notice of intent not to
renew the lease.91 Such broadening of the methods through which tenants may
invoke the protections of retaliatory eviction law demonstrates some courts’
recognition of the continuing need to evaluate and amend retaliatory eviction
law to optimally enforce its foundational policies.
B. Allowing a Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of a Tenant When Proving
a Landlord’s Retaliatory Motive
A second way courts have expanded the protection of retaliatory eviction
law is by recognizing the inherent difficulty that a tenant faces in proving the
landlord’s retaliatory motive.92 To alleviate this burden—a burden that one

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
See, e.g., Jablonski v. Clemons, 803 N.E.2d 730, 734 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
97 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (Ct. App. 1971).
Id.
Morford v. Lensey Corp., 442 N.E.2d 933, 937-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
See 438 F.2d 781, 782, 785 (1st Cir. 1971)
See, e.g., Gokey v. Bessette, 580 A.2d 488, 491 (Vt. 1990).
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court noted would be effectively insurmountable93—courts and legislatures
alike have crafted law allowing for a rebuttable presumption of retaliatory
eviction if the tenant can prove certain facts.94 For example, the tenant could
raise the presumption by showing evidence of a protected action taken shortly
before the alleged act of retaliation.95
After the tenant has presented the evidence necessary to create the
presumption, “[i]f the landlord does not meet the burden of producing
evidence of a nonretaliatory reason for termination, the statutory presumption
would compel a finding of retaliatory [action].”96 Allowing a tenant to raise
a rebuttable presumption of retaliatory eviction recognizes the tenant’s need
for more lenient burdens of proof, especially where a landlord’s subjective
intent or motive would be nearly impossible for a tenant to prove by direct
evidence.97
The judicial expansion of the methods and circumstances in which the
tenant may invoke the protections of retaliatory eviction law, combined with
judicial and legislative authority allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of
the tenant, indicates an emerging pattern of rebalancing the scales of justice.
This rebalancing furthers the foundational policies of retaliatory eviction laws
and helps tenants to effectively enforce the protections such laws afford. The
93. See id. (explaining that forcing the tenant to prove the landlord’s subjective intent
“would effectively establish such a high burden of proof for tenants that the benefit the
Legislature intended to confer would be an illusion”).
94. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-20 (West 2006), as construed in Murphy v.
Baez, 515 A.2d 383, 385 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (citing Alteri v. Layton, 408 A.2d 18 Conn.
Super. Ct. 1979)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.10, 10.12 (West 2010); Hillview Assocs. v.
Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1989) (citing IOWA CODE §§ 562A.36, 562B.32).
95. See, e.g., Hillview, 440 N.W.2d at 871 (“In an action by or against the tenant, evidence
of a complaint within six months prior to the alleged act of retaliation creates a presumption that
the landlord’s conduct was in retaliation.”).
96. Id. at 871. An argument may be made by landlord-defendants that under the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), the
combination of the tenant’s prima facie case, along with the landlord’s inability to produce
evidence of a nonretaliatory justification, without more, should no longer compel an affirmative
finding of retaliatory eviction. See id. at 513-15. Instead, it should present a factual question
for the trier of fact to determine whether the tenant has sufficiently proven that the motive for
the eviction or threat of eviction was in fact retaliatory. See id. This approach would not allow
a plaintiff-tenant to succeed by merely disproving the landlord-defendant’s proposed
nonretaliatory justification. See id. This issue is addressed in greater detail in the discussion
of the proposed operation of the rebuttable presumption in summary preliminary injunction
cases. See discussion infra Part VI.A.4. The proposed method incorporates the McDonnell
Douglas methodology used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), a case that incorporates the St. Mary’s holding. See id. at
142-43 (citing, inter alia, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
97. See discussion infra Part VI.A.4.
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reforms proposed in this comment align with this emerging pattern of reforms,
addressing the difficulty that many tenants may have in enforcing these legal
protections. It is important to note, however, that the progressive reforms
noted in this Part have been enacted or upheld in only a minority of states.98
Tenants in many states still lack the protection of any form of retaliatory
eviction prohibitions, despite the progressive developments of legal
protections in other states.99
V. Still Falling Short: Why Further Legal Developments in the Summary
Eviction Process Are Necessary to Preserve the Protections Offered by
Anti-Retaliatory Eviction Laws
Although some jurisdictions have appropriately adjusted the law of
retaliatory eviction to allow further protections for tenants seeking in good
faith to improve their living conditions,100 most of these adjustments have had
little, if any, effect on the summary eviction process.101 In fact, studies show
that the balance of power between landlords and tenants within the summary
eviction courts is skewed in favor of landlords.102

98. The states embracing such reforms include California, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Vermont. See CAL. CIV. CODE §
1942.5(f) (West 2010) (allowing tenant to bring a civil retaliatory eviction action for damages
against the landlord), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-20 (legislatively providing for a rebuttable
presumption in favor of a tenant claiming retaliatory eviction); D.C. CODE § 42-3505.02(b)
(2006) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.12 (same); Aweeka v. Bonds, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650,
651-52 (Ct. App. 1971) (upholding retaliatory eviction as an independent cause of action);
Morford v. Lensey Corp., 442 N.E.2d 933, 937-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (recognizing retaliatory
eviction as an independent cause of action); Hillview, 440 N.W.2d at 871 (citing IOWA CODE
§§ 562A.36, 562B.32) (allowing a tenant to raise a rebuttable presumption in a retaliatory
eviction claim); Jablonski v. Clemons, 803 N.E.2d 730, 734 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (citing
MASS . GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 18) (affirming the lower court’s judgment in favor of tenantdefendants on their counterclaim for retaliatory eviction and allowing use of rebuttable
presumption to prove retaliation); Gokey, 580 A.2d at 491 (citing, inter alia, VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 4465) (rejecting an argument that a tenant must prove a landlord’s subjective retaliatory
intent).
99. See supra note 65.
100. See discussion supra Part IV.
101. Recall that when seeking a preliminary injunction against a retaliatory eviction action
or pursuing a remedy for damages sustained as a result of a retaliatory eviction, tenants must
bring their actions in traditional civil courts. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
102. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 2 (reporting results from a twelve-month study of evictions
in Berkeley, California); NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2 (noting the brevity of summary
eviction proceedings and the disadvantages to tenants); A System in Collapse, supra note 5
(describing the heavy case loads resulting from tenant evictions).
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Studies into the operation of summary eviction courts have revealed
alarming disparities between landlords and tenants. To start, studies have
found that a tenant-defendant’s likelihood of winning at trial in summary
eviction court is extremely low.103 A study on Chicago eviction courts found
that “unless the case was disposed of on procedural grounds, [it] ended in the
tenant’s removal from the unit,” and that “tenants always lost on the merits.”104
An older study conducted in California “found that tenants prevail in less than
one percent of eviction cases.”105 In 2005, attorney Steven Kellman, director
of the Tenant’s Legal Center of San Diego, told the San Diego Union-Tribune
that “[a]bout 95 percent of [tenants contesting their evictions] will lose their
cases, regardless of how good a case they have.”106
Several studies have also noted the infrequency with which tenants have
legal representation at summary eviction proceedings.107 Studies show that
tenants are represented in roughly 20% of cases at best,108 and only 5% of
cases at worst.109 The same studies consistently show that landlords have
representation in the majority of cases.110 Tenants’ lack of representation
directly affects their ability to bring a case and articulate a valid defense.111 If
they raise any defense at all, tenant-defendants often attempt to defend
themselves on grounds that are not “legally germane” to the issues in their
cases—an unsurprising phenomenon, given such defendants’ lack of legal
knowledge.112 Moreover, whether a tenant even asserts a defense can depend
on whether the presiding judge prompts the tenant to do so. One study
determined that judges asked tenants if they had a defense in only 27% of
cases.113 Yet in those cases, the tenant asserted a defense 55% of the time,
compared to only 9% of the time when the judge did not ask the tenant for a
defense.114
One potential reason for the consistent rejection of tenants’ arguments and
the failure of judges to request defenses from pro se tenants is the astounding
brevity of summary eviction hearings. In Chicago, the average summary
103. See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 16-18; see also Branscomb & Sierra, supra
note 3; Gerchick, supra note 8, at 793-94.
104. NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 16, 17.
105. Gerchick, supra note 8, at 793-94.
106. Branscomb & Sierra, supra note 3.
107. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 2, at 2, 9-11; NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 13.
108. See HALL, supra note 2, at 2.
109. NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 13.
110. See HALL, supra note 2, at 2, 9-11; NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 13-14.
111. See HALL, supra note 2, at 12.
112. NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 15-16.
113. Id. at 16.
114. Id.
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eviction hearing lasted 1 minute, 44 seconds.115 Similarly, a study in
Baltimore found that its summary eviction courts were so inundated with
eviction cases that “[o]n a day with a full docket, . . . the average case receives
less than 30 seconds of judicial review.”116 Under such limited time
constraints, it is not surprising that tenants are unable to present an effective
defense. Moreover, the fact that such a brief amount of time is dedicated to a
proceeding effectively denying a tenant his home may raise legitimate due
process concerns for the tenant.
Thus, the confluence of tenants’ lack of representation or legal training and
the time constraints imposed by court systems overburdened with summary
eviction proceedings leaves many tenants unable to effectively present any
defense, much less a complicated retaliatory eviction defense. Nevertheless,
the increased number of tenants who were able to state a defense when
prompted demonstrates that if pro se tenants are given even minimal legal
assistance, they may be better able to effectively state a defense of retaliatory
eviction in traditional summary eviction proceedings.117 In the context of the
preliminary injunction hearing proposed below,118 the pro se tenant would
likely need—and ought to be afforded—this same kind of prompting to state
his affirmative claim for relief.119 This prompting could have a significant
impact on the tenant’s ability to articulate a valid argument for enjoining the
landlord’s retaliatory action.
Another factor that may affect the balance of power in summary eviction
courts is the efficiency of the process. While the efficiency of the summary
eviction process aids the interest of the landlord in regaining control of her
property and represents a fundamental aspect of the summary eviction
courts,120 the brevity of the process may be prejudicial to a pro se tenant who
115. Id. at 4, 7, 11-12.
116. A System in Collapse, supra note 5, at 2.
117. See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 16; see also supra text accompanying notes
113-14.
118. See discussion infra Part VI.
119. The reasons judges should prompt pro se tenant-plaintiffs on the various elements of
their claims in summary preliminary injunction procedures involve considerations of both
practicality and fairness. From a practical standpoint, judges would have to prompt a tenantplaintiff to present evidence; otherwise, the landlord-defendant would have nothing to contest,
and the judge would have no factual basis for a ruling. But even more importantly, as a matter
of fairness, it should be noted that summary eviction judges often help pro se landlords establish
their prima facie cases for eviction through a series of questions or other prompts. See NO TIME
FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that judges in summary eviction courts “are solicitous
in helping landlords establish their prima facie cases”). Simple fairness dictates that judges
should provide similar assistance to tenant-plaintiffs, a practice which would likely dramatically
increase tenants’ ability to successfully present their cases.
120. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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is inexperienced with the eviction process and who may have a difficult time
juggling work and/or childcare obligations on short notice.121 The summary
eviction process should not be made less efficient, however, because such a
change would effectively nullify one of the foundational reasons for the
process itself.
Instead, to mitigate this sort of built-in prejudice to tenants, a better
approach would be to allow tenants to bring affirmative preliminary injunction
actions. The tenant, as plaintiff, may have more control over the timing and
scheduling of the case and therefore may be able to plan more effectively for
work absences and childcare. Furthermore, the judge would begin the trial by
prompting the plaintiff to state her prima facie case, which would include
evidence of the landlord’s retaliatory motive.122 This simple change would,
among other things, provide the tenant sufficient time to present her case. The
judge, facing the tenant as plaintiff, would be unable to overlook the tenant’s
claim, because the prima facie case itself would depend on the tenant’s
evidence. Accordingly, providing tenants the remedy of summary preliminary
injunction proceedings could eliminate procedural prejudice in summary
eviction courts without compromising efficiency.
The summary preliminary injunction procedure may further aid tenants in
taking advantage of developments in retaliatory eviction law.123 Although only
a few studies regarding the status of summary eviction courts have been
conducted, existing reports agree that tenants are highly unlikely to be
represented in summary eviction proceedings and that the hearings are
surprisingly short when tenants do appear.124 Under these circumstances,
developments in favor of tenants under retaliatory eviction law have little
meaning. For example, the ability to utilize a rebuttable presumption is
unhelpful where the tenant is unable to state any valid defense because of lack
of legal training.125
In today’s summary eviction courts, tenants are unable to bring claims
against landlords.126 This means that tenants seeking preliminary injunctions
or bringing other affirmative claims based on retaliatory eviction cannot take
121. See JULIA ARNO ET AL., THE STATUS OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR EVICTION ACTIONS IN
CALIFORNIA: A REPORT TO THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA BOARD OF GOVERNORS 10 (2005),
http:// www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ktzdJ8BE8Uo%3D&tabid=2326; see also
NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 13 (finding that tenants failed to attend their summary
eviction proceedings 44% of the time).
122. See discussion infra Part VI.A.2.
123. See discussion supra Part IV.
124. See HALL, supra note 2, at 2, 9-12; NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 13-14; see
also supra text accompanying notes 108-09, 115-16.
125. See discussion infra Part VI.B.2.
126. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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advantage of the efficiency of the summary eviction courts, while landlords
have full access to the efficiency of summary eviction courts for their FED
actions.127 Furthermore, if tenants could only bring independent claims for
damages in summary eviction courts after an eviction had occurred, this would
frustrate the intended efficiency of the courts by introducing a claim for
damages after the eviction had been adjudicated and finalized. Once a
wrongful eviction has occurred, the efficiency of the summary eviction courts
is no longer needed and the resulting claims for damages are best left for
adjudication within the traditional civil court system.
Preliminary injunction actions, however, could be tailored to the summary
eviction process because of their necessary and intentional efficiency. Courts
in a small minority of jurisdictions use injunctions to protect against retaliatory
eviction within the traditional court or administrative system.128 But a
preliminary injunction action available within the summary eviction courts
could provide an easier, faster, and more accessible procedure than that offered
by traditional courts, precisely because summary eviction courts have been
specially created to be more efficient and accessible by the often pro se parties
involved in FED disputes. Allowing tenants who legitimately fear retaliation
from their landlords to file a preliminary injunction against retaliatory eviction
in summary eviction courts would be an effective way to ensure that tenants
facing a real threat of retaliatory eviction could preempt a landlord’s
retaliatory action against them. With a preliminary injunction action, tenants
could receive an efficient adjudication of their claims, and potentially an
injunction against the landlord’s illegal retaliation, before the landlord had the
chance to draw them into court as defendants in a summary eviction
proceeding,129 where studies show that their chances of succeeding with a
defense of retaliation are minimal.130
The efficiency of action provided to landlords in summary eviction courts
should be extended to tenants who need protection after making a good-faith
attempt to improve their living conditions. The Supreme Court of California
recently resolved an issue involving landlord-tenant disputes by noting, among
other things, the importance of affording litigants in landlord-tenant disputes
127. See discussion supra Part II.
128. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-206(e) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 223-b(3) (McKinney 2006); Smith v. D.C. Rental Accommodations
Comm’n, 411 A.2d 612, 616 & n.7 (D.C. 1980) (citing, inter alia, D.C. CODE § 45-1654)
(construing statute to allow the governing administrative body to enjoin retaliatory conduct by
landlords).
129. The policy underlying this is clearly articulated in Aweeka v. Bonds, 97 Cal. Rpt. 650,
651-52 (Ct. App. 1971). See supra text accompanying note 89.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
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“the utmost freedom of access to the courts” to bring their causes of action.131
It is important that both tenants and landlords be given a full opportunity to
have their issues adjudicated. If potential victims of retaliatory evictions were
afforded the opportunity to bring efficient, protective preliminary injunction
actions in summary eviction courts, many of the problems facing tenants in
summary eviction proceedings would be resolved, and a better balance of
power between landlords and tenants could be achieved.
VI. A New Procedure: Adapting Preliminary Injunction Actions to
Summary Eviction Courts
The summary preliminary injunction procedure melds together two
procedures already in use to protect tenants against retaliatory eviction. First
is the procedure under which tenants are allowed to bring an independent
action for damages or injunctive relief.132 Second is the summary eviction
process, which allows for efficient adjudication of a landlord’s FED claim.133
Thus, while the procedures involved in the summary preliminary injunction
would be familiar in many jurisdictions, the court involved would be different.
It is this transfer of the adjudication to the more efficient summary eviction
courts that could make a key difference in tenants’ ability to successfully
invoke the retaliatory eviction laws of their jurisdictions.134 The transfer
would, in turn, further the public policies underlying the adoption of the
prohibitions on retaliatory eviction.135 For example, if unscrupulous landlords
are more often forced to improve their property to comply with the applicable
housing code, then the overall safety of rental housing will improve.
When considering the introduction of the summary preliminary injunction,
jurisdictions should ensure that the procedure is accessible to the pro se tenant.
This would include ensuring that the procedure is both inexpensive and easily
understandable. Keeping court costs low and providing simple tenant
education on the availability, significance, and steps of the new procedure are
among the efforts that jurisdictions should make to increase tenant access.

131. Action Apartment Ass’n v. City of Santa Monica, 163 P.3d 89, 96-97 (Cal. 2007)
(upholding the litigation privilege of landlords, which was infringed by an ordinance prohibiting
them from maliciously taking action to terminate a tenancy). The same public policy that
supports a landlord’s access to the courts for efficient adjudication of claims should also support
the tenant’s right to access to the courts for an efficient adjudication of his claim.
132. See discussion supra Part IV.A; see also supra note 128 and accompanying text.
133. See discussion supra Part II.
134. See discussion supra Part IV.
135. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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A. The Proposed Process: The Preliminary Injunction Against a Landlord’s
Retaliatory Action
This section details the summary preliminary injunction procedure,
discussing the timeline, the elements of proof for both the tenant and landlord,
the operation of the rebuttable presumption in favor of the tenant, and the
duration of the injunction. Because courts across jurisdictions may differ in
opinion as to the appropriate duration of the injunction, the two most
prominent viewpoints are contrasted below. This comment favors the majority
position, which requires a landlord to prove that her retaliatory intent has
dissipated prior to bringing a second ejectment action, over the minority
position, which limits the injunction’s duration to the time necessary for the
landlord to make necessary improvements to bring the rental property up to
code.136
Legislatures introducing the summary preliminary injunction
procedure should utilize their discretion in determining such details.
1. Timeline
Essentially, the timeline for a tenant’s preliminary injunction would be the
same as that provided to a landlord for eviction of the tenant.137 The tenant
would file the claim for a preliminary injunction with the summary eviction
court in the same way that the landlord makes a claim for eviction against the
tenant. Within a matter of days, the landlord would receive notice of the claim
and a summons to appear at the hearing. At the hearing, the validity of the
tenant’s claim would be adjudicated, and if the judge or jury found that the
landlord was likely to take illegal retaliatory action, the court could issue an
injunction prohibiting the landlord from removing the tenant from the rental
unit for a specified period of time.
2. Tenant’s Burden of Proof to Make a Prima Facie Case
In order to reduce the risk of an influx of invalid claims and a corresponding
increase in the possibility of improper injunctions against the landlord’s
legitimate right to evict, the tenant seeking an injunction in summary eviction
court should bear a significant burden of proof to establish a prima facie case.
The tenant should be required to prove at least four elements by clear and
convincing evidence: a housing code violation or its equivalent, protected
action by the tenant, the absence of reasonable cause, and the likelihood of
retaliatory action.138
136. See discussion infra Part VI.A.5.
137. See discussion supra Part II.B.
138. The four elements are generally adapted from the definition of “retaliatory conduct”
in section 14.8 of the Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant. “Clear and
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First, the tenant must prove that the rental unit was in fact in a condition that
violated applicable housing codes, or at least created a reasonable cause for a
good-faith complaint by the tenant.139 Evidence of a tenant’s reasonable cause
for making the complaint would include “whether the tenant made the
complaint following investigation of the leased property.”140 Evidence of a
tenant’s good faith in reporting the violation would include the tenant’s
“reasonable efforts to bring the alleged violations to the landlord’s
attention.”141 If the tenant is found to have taken protected action with
reasonable cause and in good faith, the issue of whether the code was actually
violated may be irrelevant.142 This good-faith requirement serves dual
purposes. On one hand, it protects landlords from tenants who seek to abuse
the retaliatory eviction protections by making false reports of code violations
in order to lay the foundation for a retaliatory eviction claim or defense. On
the other hand, it still protects those tenants who in good faith report what they
believe to be code violations, thereby furthering the recognized public policy
of promoting safe housing through enforcement of the housing codes.
Second, the tenant must prove that he in fact carried out a protected action
under the applicable retaliatory eviction law.143 For example, clear and
convincing proof of the tenant’s complaint to local housing authorities might
include a copy of the complaint that had been stamped and dated by the
relevant housing agency. Additionally, the tenant would need to prove that he
took the protected action within a relatively short period of time immediately
preceding the alleged retaliatory threat or the preliminary injunction action
itself.144
convincing” is the evidentiary standard of proof applicable to the defense of retaliatory eviction.
See Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Wis. 1970).
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8(4)-(5) & cmt. g
(1977).
140. Id. § 14.8 cmt. g.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id. § 14.8(4).
144. See id. § 14.8 stat. n.3. Statutory schemes that allow the tenant to use a rebuttable
presumption to establish the landlord’s retaliatory intent typically specify a short time period
preceding the landlord’s retaliatory action; the tenant raises the presumption by proving that he
took protected action during that time period. See id. A comparison of statutory time periods
reveals that the most commonly chosen time period is six months, and the time periods
generally range in length from ninety days to one year. See id. Legislatures could reference
these time periods already in use with regard to rebuttable presumptions when establishing a
time period prior to the tenant’s summary preliminary injunction action during which the
tenant’s protected action may be used to raise a presumption of the landlord’s retaliatory intent.
Jurisdictions have the discretion to determine the statutory time period; this comparison is
provided as guidance.
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Third, the tenant must prove that no other reasonable cause existed for
eviction.145 Evidence tending to show the absence of a nonretaliatory motive
might include records or testimony demonstrating that (a) the tenant is up-todate on rent payments or (b) the tenant had not recently “been convicted of
creating a nuisance, or of reckless or willful criminal damage [to the rental
unit] by an occupant.”146 This requirement could be utilized by the court to
efficiently determine whether the landlord had a legitimate reason to evict. If
evidence of the tenant’s complete compliance with all terms of the lease were
undisputed by the landlord, the court could take the landlord’s inability to
show a legitimate reason to evict as evidence that the landlord was motivated
by an impermissible consideration, such as retaliation.147
Fourth, the tenant must prove that the landlord is likely to take imminent
retaliatory action against him.148 This element is crucial to the protection of
the landlord’s interest in the context of a preliminary injunction action. As the
First Circuit commented, “[W]e doubt whether any ‘case or controversy’ is
involved when a tenant requests a declaration of procedural rights as to an
imagined future eviction which has never been threatened.”149 Sufficient proof
of this element may include clear and convincing evidence that the landlord
served the tenant with notice of intent to evict, threatened eviction, or had
committed prior retaliatory offenses.150
145. See id. § 14.8(3) & cmt. e.
146. See Clore v. Fredman, 319 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ill. 1974) (recognizing that the combination
of such evidence constituted “prima facie evidence” of a landlord’s retaliatory motives under
the applicable ordinace); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT §
14.8 cmt. e.
147. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978), the United States
Supreme Court used such reasoning in the context of an employment discrimination case.
There, the Court determined that “when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have
been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely than not [that]
the employer . . . based his decision on an impermissible consideration.”
It should be noted that ordinarily a tenant may, pursuant to an applicable law, legally
withhold rent payments after months of inaction by a landlord when repeated requests for
remedy of code violations have been made. See, e.g., Gokey v. Bessette, 580 A.2d 488, 491
(Vt. 1990) (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4458(a)(1); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 209-10
(Vt. 1984)). Proof of such circumstances entitles the tenant to be excused from the failure to
pay rent, meaning that the landlord cannot use untimeliness of rent payment as a legitimate
motive for eviction. See id. Of course, the tenant would have to prove the fact of such
withholding and the reasonable cause for it by clear and convincing evidence. See Dickhut v.
Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Wis. 1970); see also supra note 138. By making such a
showing, the tenant could satisfy this element of the prima facie case.
148. See McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 785-86 (1st Cir. 1971).
149. Id. (citing, inter alia, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937)).
150. While these criteria serve as good indications of the likelihood of retaliatory action,
they do not represent an exhaustive list. The courts would benefit from applying a totality-of-
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These four elements of proof, when taken together, would establish the
tenant’s prima facie case, thus raising a rebuttable presumption that the
landlord harbored an impermissible retaliatory motive.151 The landlord’s
failure to overcome the presumption could lead to an injunction against
retaliatory action.152 Once the tenant made his prima facie case, the landlord
would then have various options for rebutting this presumption.
3. Landlord’s Responses to the Tenant’s Prima Facie Case
The presumption of retaliatory motives, when successfully raised by a
tenant who establishes a prima facie case for a preliminary injunction, would
impose “a burden upon the landlord to produce evidence of legitimate
nonretaliatory reasons to overcome the presumption.”153 There are two ways
that the landlord could rebut the presumption of the likelihood of a retaliatory
action.
First, the landlord may respond with evidence negating any of the elements
of the tenant’s prima facie case, thereby undermining the presumption created
by the tenant.154 For example, if the tenant provided documents demonstrating
his complaint to authorities, the landlord’s evidence that such documents were
forged or fell outside the statutory period of relevancy for protected actions
would be useful in undermining the tenant’s prima facie case.

the-circumstances test similar to that applied in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118 (2007), and its progeny to determine whether there was a “case or controversy” significant
enough for a federal court to issue a declaratory judgment in an intellectual property case.
“Basically,” the MedImmune Court wrote, “the question in each case is whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Id. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co.,
312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)); see also Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th
Cir. 2008) (applying the MedImmune test to determine the existence of a case or controversy
in a trademark infringement case); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372,
1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (same, in a patent infringement case). See generally John M. Bunting,
Note, Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp.: A New Standard for Tenth Circuit Declaratory Judgment
Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes, or How Cardtoons Got the Boot, 62 OKLA. L.
REV. 357 (2010). Just as these cases test whether a sufficiently substantial likelihood of adverse
legal action exists for the purpose of exercising declaratory judgment jurisdiction, summary
eviction courts should similarly test whether a plaintiff-tenant’s evidence of the likelihood of
a landlord’s retaliatory action is sufficient to warrant a restrictive injunction on that landlord.
151. See discussion supra Part IV.B; see also infra Part VI.A.4.
152. See Hillview Assocs. v. Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1989).
153. Id.
154. See Morford v. Lensey Corp., 442 N.E.2d 933, 937-38 (Ill. App. 1982).
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Second, the landlord may submit for the court’s consideration any evidence
of her good-faith, nonretaliatory motives for eviction.155 The landlord may
rebut evidence of the likelihood of her retaliatory action by demonstrating that
she made the determination to evict for a reason other than retaliation, and that
the eviction action would have occurred regardless of whether the tenants had
engaged in a protected action.156 The Restatement (Second) of Property:
Landlord and Tenant recognizes many factors that “tend to establish that the
landlord’s primary motivation was not retaliatory.”157 Relevant factors include
the landlord’s (1) “reasonable exercise of business judgment” in making the
decision to seek eviction; (2) intention to transfer the property “free of all
tenants”; (3) good-faith desire to use the property for a different purpose; (4)
desire to remove all tenants because the property is unsafe and the landlord
lacks the financial resources to make necessary repairs; and (5) longstanding
history demonstrating a lack of retaliatory conduct in response to tenants’
protected actions, despite the landlord’s knowledge of such actions.158 If the
landlord negated an element of the tenant’s prima facie case or provided
evidence of a nonretaliatory motive, a question of fact would be presented for
determination by the factfinder.159
4. Effect of the Rebuttable Presumption
This comment suggests that jurisdictions utilize a rebuttable presumption
in favor of the tenant-plaintiff in the summary preliminary injunction
procedure in order to most efficiently determine the validity of a retaliatory
eviction claim. While not all jurisdictions embrace the rebuttable presumption
in favor of the tenant in retaliatory eviction cases, it has been introduced in
some jurisdictions to aid the tenant in proving that the landlord’s motivation
was retaliatory.160 Without the aid of a rebuttable presumption, tenants would
have difficulty proving the necessary element of the landlord’s retaliatory
intent.161 The rebuttable presumption should be allowed in the summary
preliminary injunction procedure for the same reason.
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8(4) & cmt. f
(1977).
156. Jablonski v. Clemons, 803 N.E.2d 730, 734 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (citing MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 18).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8 cmt. f.
158. See id. (listing additional factors).
159. See Morford, 442 N.E.2d at 937-38; Hillview Assocs. v. Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d 867,
871 (Iowa 1989); cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000)
(addressing shifting burdens of proof in the context of employment discrimination).
160. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 94.
161. See Gokey v. Bessette, 580 A.2d 488, 491 (Vt. 1990) (rejecting use of a subjective test
for determining a landlord’s motivation); see also supra note 93.
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The United States Supreme Court analyzed the use of a rebuttable
presumption in cases involving employment discrimination in its unanimous
decision, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products.162 In Reeves, the Court
delineated the proper method of utilizing a rebuttable presumption and its
effect on the burdens of persuasion and production.163 The circumstances and
elements of proof involved in both employment discrimination claims and
retaliatory eviction claims are similar enough to justify the use of a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the plaintiff in the retaliatory eviction context.164
First, both types of claims require proof of a defendant’s illegal motivation.
Plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases must prove that their age,
gender, race, or other legally protected trait motivated their employer to
discriminate against them, while plaintiffs in retaliatory eviction cases must
prove that their complaints motivated their landlord to retaliate against them.165
In the context of the summary preliminary injunction, the elements of the
tenant’s prima facie case are intended, when taken together, to show a
likelihood that the landlord will act with an impermissible retaliatory
motive.166
Second, in claims of both employment discrimination and retaliatory
eviction, the required proof of the defendant’s illegal motivation usually
cannot be shown by direct evidence of subjective motivation.167 Unless the
plaintiff has direct proof of the defendant’s motivation to act illegally, in the
form of a statement or otherwise, the required element of illegal motivation
must be proven by circumstantial evidence.168
Thus, the rebuttable
presumption is useful because it allows the plaintiff to prove a set of
circumstances that creates an inference of the defendant’s illegal motivation;
if the defendant cannot or does not provide a nonretaliatory alternative

162. See 530 U.S. at 143-48 (applying the rebuttable presumption in a case brought under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)).
163. See id. at 142-43.
164. In Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1970), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
recognized a similar comparison between employment discrimination and retaliatory eviction
cases, noting that both require a factual finding of the defendant’s motivation, which is difficult
to prove. See id. at 302 (quoting Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 702-03 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
165. Compare Reeves, 530 U.S at 141 (requiring that the alleged discriminatory act be based
on a prohibited characteristic), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT
§ 14.8(4) (1977) (requiring proof of a landlord’s retaliatory motivation).
166. See discussion supra Part VI.A.2; see also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
167. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141; Gokey v. Bessette, 580 A.2d 488, 491 (Vt. 1990); see also
supra note 93.
168. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141; Gokey, 580 A.2d at 491.
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explanation for the circumstances, the tenant’s evidence stands as proof of the
illegal motivation.169
This shift of the evidentiary burden to the defendant is considered fair in
such cases because the defendant “is in the best position to put forth the actual
reason for its decision.”170 The use of the rebuttable presumption in the
summary preliminary injunction procedure would therefore force the landlord,
who is likely to have the best evidence of her own motivation, to timely
introduce such evidence. The similarities between the proof required in
employment discrimination and retaliatory eviction claims demonstrate that
the same rebuttable presumption that the Supreme Court applies in the
employment discrimination context can and should apply in the context of an
action for summary preliminary injunction against retaliatory eviction.
Within the summary preliminary injunction procedure, the rebuttable
presumption of retaliation would shift the burden of production from the
plaintiff-tenant to the defendant-landlord.171 There are four steps involved in
the burden-shifting process. The plaintiff-tenant must first establish a prima
facie case.172 Then, the burden shifts to the defendant-landlord to produce
evidence demonstrating that she acted for a legitimate and legal reason.173 If
the defendant does not “produc[e] evidence of a nonretaliatory reason for
termination, the . . . presumption would compel a finding of retaliatory lease
termination.”174 But if the defendant successfully produces evidence of her
legitimate motivation, the presumption disappears and no longer compels a

169. See Hillview Assocs. v. Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1989).
170. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 134 (discussing the rebuttable presumption in the context of
employment discrimination).
171. This comment suggests the use of the McDonnell Douglas framework for burden
shifting under a rebuttable presumption. This framework was established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), a Title VII case, and has since been
applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in other types of cases. See, e.g., Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-48
(applying the McDonnell Douglas framework in an ADEA case). Courts have also applied this
framework to the establishment of a retaliatory eviction defense. See, e.g., Hillview, 440
N.W.2d at 870-71. Moreover, while the Supreme Court has refined the framework in
subsequent employment law cases, the changes rest specifically on interpretations of statutory
employment law. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). See generally
Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, Much Ado About Nothing—Why Desert Palace
Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas Nor Transformed All Employment Discrimination Cases
to Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 395 (2005). Retaliatory eviction law arises from a
separate statutory and/or common law foundation, and therefore the traditional McDonnell
Douglas framework remains a sound model for proof of causation in a retaliatory eviction case.
172. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142.
173. See id.
174. Hillview, 440 N.W.2d at 871.
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finding for the plaintiff.175 In the latter case, the plaintiff has the “opportunity
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered
by the defendant were not [her] true reasons, but were a pretext,” used to cover
an illegal motive such as discrimination or retaliation.176
When determining whether the defendant’s proffered motivation is
pretextual, the factfinder “may still consider the evidence establishing the
plaintiff’s prima facie case ‘and inferences properly drawn therefrom.’”177 At
a minimum, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence for a reasonable
factfinder to determine that the defendant’s reason is pretextual in order to
prevail.178 It is also important to note that while the rebuttable presumption
shifts the ultimate burden of production between the parties, the burden of
persuasion “remains at all times with the plaintiff.”179 This means that in the
context of the summary preliminary injunction procedure, the tenant would at
all times bear the burden of convincing the factfinder that the landlord intends
and is likely to evict him based on retaliatory motives.
The burden-shifting process in the proposed summary preliminary
injunction procedure can thus be summarized as follows: First, the tenant
would be required to present evidence proving each of the four elements
required to establish his prima facie case.180 Then, the landlord would rebut
the presumption by introducing evidence negating the tenant’s prima facie
case, or with evidence of her legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for evicting.181
If the landlord did not introduce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption,
the presumption could provide a basis for judgment in favor of the plaintiff.182
If the landlord introduced sufficient rebuttal evidence, the presumption would
disappear and the tenant would then have the opportunity to introduce
evidence disproving the landlord’s rebuttal evidence.183 Finally, the jury or
summary eviction judge may consider all the evidence submitted by both
175. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43; see also W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Effect of
Presumption as Evidence or upon Burden of Proof, Where Controverting Evidence Is
Introduced, 5 A.L.R.3D 19, § 4[a] (1966) (providing an detailed explanation of how the
introduction of controverting evidence eliminates a presumption).
176. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (quoting Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981)).
177. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10).
178. See id. at 148 (holding that “a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient
evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact
to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated”).
179. Id. at 143 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
180. See discussion supra Part VI.A.2.
181. See discussion supra Part VI.A.3.
182. See Hillview Assocs. v. Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1989).
183. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43.
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parties to determine whether the landlord harbored a retaliatory motive to
evict.184
5. Duration of Injunction
If the tenant prevailed in his claim of retaliatory eviction, the summary
eviction court would issue an injunction prohibiting the landlord from taking
any retaliatory action. One issue that arises in this circumstance is the duration
of the injunction. The landlord has an interest in not being saddled indefinitely
with a problematic tenant, while the tenant has a corresponding interest in
security of tenure.185
Whether in summary eviction proceedings or in traditional civil actions for
damages or injunctive relief, when courts find that a landlord acted on a
retaliatory motive, they generally split into two distinct positions with regard
to how much time must pass before, and what factors should be used to
determine when, the landlord can bring a subsequent FED action. In one camp
are the courts that have adopted the position that the landlord’s retaliatory
motive must dissipate—or at least cease to predominate the landlord’s decision
to evict—before she can legally evict the tenant.186 This position requires the
landlord, after she has been found to have harbored a retaliatory motive, to
“prove that [her] actions are primarily motivated by a permissible, nonretaliatory purpose.”187 Courts taking this position require a factual finding of
the landlord’s subjective motivation; consequently, a case-by-case adjudication
is necessary to determine whether the landlord may lawfully evict.188 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he question of permissible or
impermissible purpose is one of fact for the court or jury,” even when the
landlord’s motivation and intent are being adjudicated a second time.189 The
Restatement recognizes that the finding of the same landlord’s retaliatory
motive at an earlier time is relevant, “but not conclusive,” evidence in
determining motive in the second eviction action.190 Other relevant factors in
a subsequent adjudication of a retaliatory eviction claim include “the length of
184. For an example of how burden shifting operates in the context of a tenant’s defense of
retaliatory eviction, see Hillview, 440 N.W.2d at 871-73.
185. See Markese v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 75 (Monroe County Ct. 1972); Roisman,
supra note 69, at 820-29; see also discussion supra Parts II.A, III.C.2.
186. See, e.g., Hillview, 440 N.W.2d at 871 (citing Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 702
(D.C. Cir. 1968)); Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Wis. 1970) (quoting same). The
Restatement takes this approach as well. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD
& TENANT § 14.8 cmts. f, i (1977).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8 rep. n.7.
188. See Hillview, 440 N.W.2d at 871 (quoting Edwards, 397 F.2d at 702).
189. See Dickhut, 173 N.W.2d at 302 (quoting Edwards, 397 F.2d at 702).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8 cmt. i.
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time that has elapsed since the previous determination and whether the tenant
has repeated the acts which previously caused the landlord to retaliate.”191
Proponents of the above position may argue that the policies underlying the
retaliatory eviction doctrine are fulfilled by a subjective, case-by-case
adjudication of the landlord’s intent. Only with such a subjective adjudication
can a tenant truly be protected from a wrongful eviction in response to his
good-faith, reasonable complaint about living conditions. Allowing landlords
the freedom to bring a second action to evict, without another full adjudication
of their motives, would make hollow the tenant’s initial victory of having
proven the landlord’s retaliatory motive. Tenants would not only still face the
possibility of retaliatory eviction but would also be unable to protect
themselves from it.
A second group of courts have taken the alternative position that an
objective test is needed, arguing that a landlord may bring a subsequent FED
action once she has brought the rental unit into compliance with applicable
codes.192 Tempering this position is the caveat that after the repairs are made,
the landlord should allow the tenant a reasonable amount of time to find
substitute housing prior to seeking eviction.193 Nonetheless, this position
allows the landlord to evict the tenant after the necessary repairs are made
regardless of whether the landlord’s “original retaliatory motive remains
unchanged.”194 The Utah Supreme Court clarified the policy underlying this
rule, stating that
because the [subsequent eviction] action may still be tainted with
an unlawful motive, the burden is on the landlord to show that he
has given the tenant a reasonable opportunity to procure other
housing. Thus, the landlord is not deprived of his right to evict a
complaining tenant, but the exercise of that right is deferred until
he has remedied the housing or health code violation and the tenant
has had a reasonable opportunity to find other housing.195
This rule regarding the duration of the injunction primarily expresses the
public policy that a landlord should not be forced to accomodate “a perpetual
tenant” as a result of a previous judicial finding of the landlord’s retaliatory

191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Markese v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 75 (Monroe County Ct. 1972).
193. See id. (noting that “court[s] should be generous in allowing the tenant sufficient time,
without the pressure normally exerted in a holdover eviction proceeding, to find other suitable
housing”); see also Bldg. Monitoring Sys., Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Utah 1995).
194. See Markese, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
195. Paxton, 905 P.2d at 1219.
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motive.196 Furthermore, if the landlord is enjoined from evicting a tenant until
the necessary repairs are complete, the landlord is given even greater incentive
to make the necessary repairs, which furthers the public policy of maintaining
the safety of housing.
Nevertheless, practical problems arise with this objective standard. First,
there is no consideration of what would happen if the tenant failed to find
substitute housing.197 Particularly in areas plagued by shortages in affordable
housing, a serious threat of homelessness could arise for the evicted tenant.198
Second, the fundamental public policy of improving the safety of rental
housing may also be undercut. Proponents of the minority position may argue
that because retaliatory-minded landlords cannot evict until the necessary
repairs are made, those landlords have an incentive to efficiently repair their
property.
Yet, while the injunction may motivate some landlords to efficiently repair
their property, it may allow other landlords to remain inattentive to code
violations, effectively leaving the tenant imprisoned in substandard living
conditions. Additionally, tenants in these situations may be unable to register
a complaint with the housing authorities out of fear of further retaliatory
threats or actions. These policy concerns demonstrate that the kind of case-bycase adjudication of the landlord’s subjective intent advocated by the first
cohort of courts best promotes the policies underlying the adoption of
retaliatory eviction prohibitions.199 Thus, for the landlord to evict after the
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8 rep. n.7.
197. See id.
198. See id.; see also discussion supra Part III.C.3.
199. Critics of the position that the landlord should be required to demonstrate the absence
or dissipation of any retaliatory motive prior to a subsequent FED action may claim that placing
such a burden on the landlord will result in inefficiency contrary to the purpose of FED statutes
and summary eviction courts. This argument suffers from two major flaws: First, there would
be a negligible impact on the number of cases filed, because FED statutes require that the
landlord file a summary eviction action and appear in court before a writ of possession may be
issued. See discussion supra Part II.B. Second, the summary eviction courts were not created
to minimize the number of eviction cases heard, but rather to increase it by offering an efficient
alternative to landlord self-help. See discussion supra Part II.A. The addition of one element
of proof to the landlord’s burden in the rare preliminary injunction case is unlikely to negatively
impact the efficiency of these courts.
XXAdditionally, summary eviction courts were created not only to provide an efficient method
of adjudicating FED claims, but also to serve as a mandatory judicial alternative to landlord
self-help. See Gerchick, supra note 8, at 776-77; Spector, supra note 7, at 152-60; see also
supra text accompanying notes 10-12. One priority of the summary eviction process is that all
evictions be adjudicated in a court of law, and requiring the landlord to demonstrate that her
retaliatory motive has dissipated simply furthers the purpose of ensuring that all eviction claims
are given a full adjudication in court.
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imposition of a preliminary injunction, she should be required to demonstrate
that her retaliatory motive has dissipated.
B. Practicalities: Costs to and Education of Tenants
Some courts have recognized that low-income tenants living in tight urban
housing markets are the renters who most need retaliatory eviction
protections.200 Such “low-income tenants are often forced to accept
substandard housing because of unequal bargaining power” with landlords.201
Tenants with greater financial resources, or who live in markets where
affordable rental housing is readily available, are less likely to face the literal
threat of homelessness or the instability of shelter dependence. Low-income
urban tenants therefore have the greatest interest in maintaining tenure in their
rental units, even under substandard housing conditions and/or strained
relationships with their landlords. These are the tenants in the position to
receive the greatest benefit from a summary preliminary injunction.
Low-income tenants may be unable to take full advantage of the summary
preliminary injunction procedure, either because of the cost of filing fees or
because they are unaware of the legal protections provided by anti-retaliatory
eviction laws and summary preliminary injunction proceedings. To ensure
that the protections provided by the addition of a summary preliminary
injunction proceeding are realistically available to low-income tenants, filing
fees and court costs need to be kept to a minimum, and the law should require
efforts to notify and educate tenants about the available protections.
1. Ensuring That the Summary Preliminary Injunction Procedure Is Not
Cost Prohibitive
In order to ensure the ability of low-income tenants to bring a summary
preliminary injunction proceeding against their landlords, the filing fees and
court costs should be minimized. The efficiency of summary eviction courts
makes it feasible to keep the costs of the proceedings low. Some jurisdictions
have already demonstrated the ability to contain the costs of summary eviction
procedures.202 For example, the filing fee for summary eviction in Baltimore,
Maryland, in 2003 was only nine dollars, and the total fee for the summary
procedure was thirty-nine dollars.203 The filing fees for summary eviction in
200. See, e.g., P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah 1991); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.8(1) (recognizing the special need for
protection of low- and moderate-income tenants in multi-unit housing); Roisman, supra note
69, at 823.
201. Dennison, Eviction Claims, supra note 56, § 2.
202. See A System in Collapse, supra note 5, at 6.
203. Id.
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the District of Columbia at that time were more than double Baltimore’s but
remained relatively low at twenty-three dollars.204 Because the summary
preliminary injunction procedure should take approximately the same amount
of time as the summary eviction procedure,205 costs should be comparable
between the two actions.
Another method that could be successful in keeping the summary
preliminary injunction affordable for tenants is requiring the landlord to pay
court costs and attorneys’ fees when the tenant prevails in showing a high
likelihood of retaliatory eviction. For example, the Chicago Residential
Landlord and Tenant Ordinance provides that if the tenant prevails on a
retaliatory eviction claim, the tenant may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees
and the greater of either two months’ rent or twice the damages sustained by
the tenant.206 URLTA, enacted in many states,207 is even more generous. It
allows for recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees plus monetary damages not
to exceed the greater of three months’ rent or three times the actual damages
sustained by the tenant.208 Low income tenants could use such monetary
damages to cover the costs of the summary preliminary injunction.
Admittedly, the amounts awarded a tenant-plaintiff for damages in
connection with the summary preliminary injunction procedure would be low,
because the tenant would not have suffered the negative effects of the eviction
action. Even though the monetary damages suffered by the tenant would be
minimal, the policy of providing tenants liberal monetary damages expressed
in these statutes applies similarly to the summary preliminary injunction
process. Forcing a losing landlord to pay a prevailing tenant’s court costs and
attorneys’ fees in the summary preliminary injunction suit is fair and furthers
the purpose of the injunction in two primary ways. First, the minimal fees
associated with the procedure209 are likely to be an insignificant burden on the
landlord as compared to the tenant, who is likely to have a restricted income.
Second, though the court costs are minimal, the possibility of having to pay the
fees may deter some landlords from making illegal threats of retaliatory
eviction as a method of tenant intimidation and control when a tenant could
use those threats as evidence in a summary preliminary injunction action.
With this method in place, court fees associated with the summary preliminary

204. Id.
205. See discussion supra Part VI.A.1.
206. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 5-12-150 (1990).
207. See Dennison, Eviction Claims, supra note 56, § 3 n.2; Dennison, Tenant’s Rights,
supra note 46, § 3 n.37.
208. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 4.107 (1972).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05.
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injunction proceeding would not make the procedure cost prohibitive for lowincome tenants.
2. Ensuring Proper Notification and Education of Tenants Regarding
Tenants’ Rights in Cases of Probable Retaliatory Eviction
The low probability that tenants bringing retaliatory eviction claims will
have legal representation210 increases the need for effective education of
tenants concerning their rights under anti-retaliatory eviction laws and the
summary preliminary injunction procedure. Even if enacted, the procedure
will be ineffective if tenants are unaware of their legal right to seek an
injunction against landlords’ retaliatory actions. Therefore, because many
tenants appear pro se in summary eviction courts,211 written instructions
describing the elements they are required to prove should be provided to
tenants filing a summary preliminary injunction action. While studies show
that pro se tenants have difficulty presenting valid and successful defenses,212
“there is a small but significant number of tenants who, as shown by [the] data,
probably could have asserted effective habitability defenses had they known
how to do so correctly before the eviction process was initiated.”213 The
simple education of tenants regarding their rights, and what proof they would
need to be successful in court, could significantly improve their ability to take
advantage of the protections offered by retaliatory eviction laws in their
jurisdictions.214
a) Notification and Education of Tenants
In order to effectively educate tenants about their rights, the statute or
ordinance enabling the use of the summary preliminary injunction procedure
should require that tenants be given a notification of rights prior to the
instigation of the summary eviction process. There are two critical junctures
at which such notification would be most effective for a tenant: either at the
signing of the lease or upon the completion of a protected action.215 The

210. NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 13; see also supra text accompanying notes 10709.
211. See HALL, supra note 2, at 2; NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 15-16.
212. See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 15-16.
213. Id. at 22.
214. See id. (noting that “[t]enant education could . . . have a profound impact on tenants’
ability to participate as equals in the adversarial process”); see also supra text accompanying
notes 113-14.
215. For a list of the most common tenant actions protected by anti-retaliation statutes, see
supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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relevant lawmaking body could adjust the precise method and contents of such
notification as necessary to fit needs of the jurisdiction.
To mandate notification regarding the summary preliminary injunction
procedure at signing, lawmakers would simply need to amend or modify the
list of notifications that landlords are already required by law to provide in
many jurisdictions. For example, the City of Chicago requires all landlords,
upon the signing or renewal of a lease, to notify tenants of any code violations
for which the rental unit has been cited within the preceding twelve months.216
Illinois law also requires the landlord to notify prospective tenants of rental
units built before 1978 regarding the health risks associated with lead
exposure.217 These statutes requiring health notifications upon the signing of
a lease demonstrate how easily an additional mandatory notification of tenants’
rights under anti-retaliatory eviction laws could be implemented.218
Mandatory notification immediately after a tenant has taken a protected
action could be an even more effective procedure for ensuring tenants’ rights.
For example, the relevant statute or ordinance could mandate that the person
216. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 5-12-100 (1990).
217. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/9.1 (West 2005) (requiring that “[b]efore entering
into a residential lease agreement, all owners of residential buildings or dwelling units built
before 1978 . . . give prospective lessees information on the potential health hazards posed by
lead in residential dwellings by providing the prospective lessee with a copy of an informational
brochure”).
218. A more passive option is to require notification to the general public through the
distribution of brochures in public venues, such as public transportation, libraries, courthouses,
and schools. One study on the summary eviction process reported that advertising in public
areas by “directing tenants to toll-free numbers or public service websites has been effective in
the public health field,” and concluded that similar public service advertising would likely prove
effective if utilized in the field of landlord-tenant law. NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at
23. The State of Illinois has for some time mandated a notification-by-uniform-brochure
method in the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act, 410 ILL. C OMP. STAT. ANN. 45/9.1, requiring
landlords to provide tenants with “an informational brochure provided by the [state public
health] Department.”
XXIn the retaliatory eviction context, the brochure, toll-free numbers, or public-service websites
given to tenants would inform them of the law prohibiting retaliatory eviction, their right to
either raise retaliatory eviction as a defense or bring a preliminary injunction action against a
landlord’s retaliatory eviction in summary eviction courts, and the evidence they are required
to show to succeed in their claim. To ensure that the information provided to the public is
uniform, effective, and comprehensive, the regulating government authority should compose
this information and make it available to tenants.
XXOf course, the major drawback to this kind of general public notification is that it places the
burden of obtaining or accessing the information on those who most need the information, many
of whom may not frequent the places where the information is distributed. Mandatory
notification at signing thus represents a better approach, especially in light of the minimal
burden such mandate places on landlords.
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or entity who receives a tenant’s complaint (whether a government agency or
the landlord) provide the tenant with an informational brochure at the time of
receiving such complaint; likewise, tenant organizations could provide such
information to new members.219 Because it creates a nexus between a tenant’s
actual conduct and notification of his rights, this kind of requirement would
better guarantee that those tenants who are most likely to be victims of
retaliatory action have pertinent information regarding their rights.
b) Mitigating the Intimidation Factor: Enabling Pro Se Tenants Through
Procedural Accommodations and Courtroom Orientation
The procedural complexities of appearing in summary eviction court,
whether as a plaintiff or defendant, can create an intimidating and frustrating
experience for the pro se tenant.220 To alleviate the intimidation factor, and to
give the pro se tenant confidence to bring a summary preliminary injunction
action in court, jurisdictions could provide clear procedures for filing the suit,
along with easily accessible educational materials regarding trial procedure
and evidentiary requirements.
First, jurisdictions could offer an easily accessible and efficient method for
filing a summary preliminary injunction suit. Most jurisdictions with
summary eviction procedures already offer the landlord an efficient and
inexpensive method of filing an eviction proceeding.221 Landlords, who
themselves often appear pro se,222 are easily able to file for summary eviction
and can have their claims adjudicated within a matter of days.223 The simple
process provided for landlords could also be offered to tenants filing summary
preliminary injunction proceedings. Courts have developed simple filing
procedures in a variety of other contexts where plaintiffs are likely to appear
pro se. For example, in many states the process of requesting a protective
order to prevent domestic violence is intentionally efficient and simple,
making it more accessible to pro se plaintiffs seeking physical protection.224
219. Government agencies, landlords, and tenant organizations are the typical recipients of
complaints protected by law. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
220. See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 22.
221. See discussion supra Part II.B and text accompanying notes 202-04.
222. See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 13; see also HALL, supra note 2, at 11-12.
223. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 2009) (requiring use of application
forms and describing the application process); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6222, 6226 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2010) (providing that the application for a protective order can be filed without a filing
fee and requiring the Judicial Council to “promulgate forms and instructions for applying for
[protective] orders”). In Connecticut and California, as well as in other states with similar
protective order legislation, informational brochures or websites are commonly available to aid
the pro se applicant when filing a protective order. See, e.g., Connecticut Network for Legal
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Courts can develop similarly efficient and simple methods for filing summary
preliminary injunction lawsuits to empower pro se tenants seeking protection
from retaliatory action by their landlords.
Another service that may mitigate the intimidation factor is the creation of
easily accessible educational materials clearly describing trial procedures and
evidentiary requirements. In addition to a government-issued brochure
describing the tenants’ rights and the evidentiary requirements at trial,225 the
state or pro bono legal services could create more detailed educational
materials, such as a video, describing the process of the summary preliminary
injunction and the evidentiary requirements. For example, the pro bono
organization Illinois Legal Aid has produced a series of educational videos that
are available to pro se parties on the internet free of charge.226 One video,
specifically describing actions in the summary eviction courts, details
appropriate courtroom decorum, how to locate the courtroom, where to sit or
stand, and when to present the appropriate evidence.227
A similar video produced for the purpose of educating pro se tenants on the
summary preliminary injunction procedure could describe the four elements
of evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case. For example, the video
could inform the tenant of specific evidence that would likely fulfill the
evidentiary requirements for each element. It could instruct the tenant to bring
to court pictures of the substandard housing conditions, a record of complaints
to a governmental agency, receipts proving timely payment of rent, and
witnesses to testify to the landlord’s threat of eviction, among other possible
pieces of evidence. Additionally, the video might inform the tenant of the
practicalities of courtroom procedure, such as when to present evidence and
when the landlord has the opportunity to defend herself. Such a video, or any
kind of detailed information provided to the tenant, could give a tenant the
confidence to bring a suit pro se and increase the chances that the tenant will
prevail.228
Aid, How to Ask for a Restraining Order, http://www.ctnla.org/how-to-ask-for-a-restrainingorder (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); eHow, How to File a Restraining Order in California,
http://www.ehow.com/how_4799421_file-restraining-order-california.html (last visited Nov.
11, 2010). In Connecticut, the forms required to file for a domestic violence restraining order
are available online, see State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, Official Court Webforms,
http://www.jud2.ct.gov/webforms/#FAMILY2 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (follow the “JD-FM137" hyperlink and the “JD-FM-138" hyperlink) (providing .pdf copies of “Application For
Relief From Abuse” and the supporting affidavit form).
225. See discussion supra Part VI.B.2.a and note 218.
226. E.g., Going to Daley Center Eviction Court (Illinois Legal Aid 2007),
http://www.illinoislegalaid.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.dsp_content&contentID=5552.
227. See id.
228. See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 22; see also discussion supra Part V.
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c) Effect of the Preliminary Summary Eviction Procedure on Tenants
with Representation
Even though the majority of tenants appear pro se in summary eviction
courts, studies show that a small percentage of them retain lawyers for
representation.229 A study of Chicago summary eviction courts demonstrated
that the tenants who were taken to court in eviction actions brought by their
landlords typically lost, whether or not they had retained legal
representation.230 This reveals an overall bias in favor of landlords in summary
eviction proceedings, which even the representation of a capable lawyer
cannot effectively combat.231 Thus, allowing a tenant to bring an efficient
protective action against imminent retaliatory eviction by a landlord before
encountering the bias inherent in the summary eviction process may aid not
only pro se tenants but those with legal representation as well. The summary
preliminary injunction proceeding would undoubtedly impose a significant
evidentiary burden on the tenant, especially the pro se tenant. Nevertheless,
evidence shows that this burden would not be insurmountable if the tenant is
properly educated or has legal representation. The evidentiary burden would
be considerably less daunting for the tenant with legal counsel, and that tenant
would therefore have a good chance of prevailing on the merits if his claim of
retaliatory eviction was meritorious. Therefore, vulnerable tenants, whether
proceeding pro se or with representation, could successfully use the summary
preliminary injunction to protect their homes.
C. Fulfilling the Policies Underlying Retaliatory Eviction Law
The opening of summary eviction courts to preliminary injunction actions
brought by tenants with legitimate fears of retaliatory conduct would further
the foundational public policies of retaliatory eviction law.232
First, preliminary injunction actions would fulfill the public policy of
improving public housing in two major ways. One, the increased protection
offered to tenants, through their ability to bring a preliminary injunction action
229. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 2, at 9-11; NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 13; see
also supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
230. See NO TIME FOR J USTICE, supra note 2, at 16-18. This fact has engendered some
debate over what difference, if any, legal representation for the tenant makes for the general
outcome of the case. Compare id. at 17 (finding no indication that represented tenants’ cases
were less likely to result in eviction than pro se tenants’ cases, though often the final eviction
was delayed longer if the tenant had representation), with HALL, supra note 2, at 2, 11-13
(noting that tenants’ odds of prevailing increase with representation).
231. See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 17-18, 20-21.
232. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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to protect their interest in security of tenure, would encourage more
widespread reporting of housing, sanitary, and health code violations. Two,
the tenant’s ability to bring an efficient and low-cost preliminary injunction
action would also dissuade retaliatory-minded landlords from making threats
of eviction as a means of tenant control, because such threats could later serve
as evidence upon which the preliminary injunction against eviction could be
granted. So if the procedure discouraged landlord threats and facilitated better
enforcement of legal protections for tenant complaints, greater overall
compliance with applicable housing, sanitary, and health codes would seem
to naturally result. This dynamic would promote the upkeep of decent housing
for low-income tenants.
Second, summary preliminary injunction action would serve the policy of
social stability. Not only would tenants be able to take action toward
improvement of their living conditions, but they would be better able to protect
their interest in remaining in their homes, with all the benefits security of
tenure brings. The procedure would therefore avoid many of the negative
social effects triggered by involuntary displacement, such as educational
problems, loss of employment, unnecessary economic loss, and homelessness.
Third, the costs of eviction that accrue to the government would decrease
in proportion to the number of wrongful evictions that would be avoided each
year. Though governmental entities would still bear the financial burden
resulting from the effects of rightful evictions, the summary preliminary
injunction procedure would necessarily reduce the overall number of evictions.
For every tenant able to remain in his home as a result of an injunction against
his landlord’s retaliatory action, the government would save the post-eviction
clean-up or housing costs that it would otherwise incur if the tenant had been
wrongfully evicted.233
VII. Responses to Arguments Against the Introduction of the Summary
Preliminary Injunction Procedure
A. Effect on the Overloaded Dockets of Summary Eviction Courts
Opponents of the proposed summary preliminary injunction procedure may
claim that its introduction would put greater stress on the already overcrowded
summary eviction court dockets, thus even further diminishing a tenant’s
ability to represent himself.234 But careful analysis reveals at least two reasons
why the proposed procedure is likely to have little impact on the actual number
of cases adjudicated in summary eviction courts. First, the likelihood of
233. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
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frequent resort to the summary preliminary injunction procedure is minimized
by the limited conditions under which the action could be brought—namely,
either actual threats of retaliatory eviction or good cause to believe that the
tenant will suffer a retaliatory eviction in response to an action protected by
retaliatory eviction laws.235 Second, if the tenant is successful in his
preliminary injunction claim because of probable retaliatory eviction, that case
is likely to replace the eviction action that the landlord might have otherwise
intended or threatened to file. Similarly, if the tenant loses his preliminary
injunction action, it is likely because the landlord has evidence of her good
cause for eviction and therefore could win on a counterclaim for eviction
brought in the same hearing.
Moreover, even in the unlikely event that the addition of the summary
preliminary injunction procedure were to put greater pressure on eviction court
dockets, the overall increase in fairness to tenants would outweigh any minor
loss of efficiency that the procedure might cause. Regardless of the time
constraints placed on summary eviction courts, tenants’ cases should be heard.
Summary eviction courts provide a venue for landlords to get an efficient
adjudication of their rights,236 and tenants should be afforded the same
opportunity when circumstances warrant their protection. Further, tenants’
ability to protect their rights proactively in summary eviction courts effectuates
the policies underlying anti-retaliatory eviction laws.237 And the narrow scope
of the procedure will prevent any dramatic influx of cases, thus preserving the
intended efficiency of summary eviction courts. These considerations point
to the conclusion that the public interest in protecting tenants’ rights and
enforcing anti-retaliatory eviction laws significantly outweighs the minimal
loss of efficiency that the summary preliminary injunction procedure might
cause.
B. Potential for Tenant Abuse
Opponents of the summary preliminary injunction procedure may also claim
that tenants would abuse the procedure by instigating a summary preliminary
injunction action for the purpose of delaying a proper eviction. The opponents
may cite studies such as one California study that claimed that the vast
majority of tenant-defendants in summary eviction procedures only contest

235. See discussion supra Part VI.A.2.
236. See discussion supra Part II.A.
237. See discussion supra Part VI.C.
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their cases as a means of delaying eviction.238 This study, however, failed to
provide any statistical evidence to support its claim.239
Moreover, contesting a landlord’s summary eviction claim and affirmatively
seeking injunctive relief are two very different postures. In the former, tenants
have already involuntarily been made a party to an eviction claim against them
and therefore have little to lose by contesting the eviction, which may buy a
few days or weeks for a tenant to locate a new apartment. By contrast, tenants
contemplating an action for summary preliminary injunction have greater
incentive to proceed cautiously. First, the tenant might face having to pay the
court costs and his attorneys’ fees if he loses the case.240 Such costs can be a
serious consideration for a low-income tenant. Second, if the tenant’s purpose
is to delay his proper eviction, he is in no way guaranteed that a summary
preliminary injunction suit will accomplish this. In fact, he may inadvertently
accelerate his eviction. For example, if a tenant who has no evidence to
support a claim of retaliatory eviction files a claim for a summary preliminary
injunction, the landlord with good cause to evict is likely to appear at trial,
counterclaim for eviction, and in turn receive a writ of possession. Thus, the
tenant may bring the landlord into court with a summary preliminary
injunction claim before the landlord has a chance to bring the tenant into court
under an FED claim.
Moreover, even if some tenants do use the summary preliminary injunction
procedure as a means of delay, this tactic would impose only a minor
inconvenience on landlords. Tenants using the procedure purely as a delay
tactic are unlikely to have sufficient evidence to meet the detailed elements
necessary to make out a prima facie case.241 The tenant’s case would then fail,
and the landlord would be left with two rather positive outcomes. First, if the
landlord did not file a counterclaim for eviction, the efficiency of the summary
eviction courts would virtually ensure dismissal within a matter of days or
weeks, and the landlord would only have lost the time required to appear in
court. Second, if the landlord filed a counterclaim for eviction and prevailed,
she would receive a writ of possession earlier than anticipated. Therefore, the
summary preliminary injunction procedure is unlikely to be abused by tenants
238. CAL. APARTMENT LAW INFO. FOUND., UNLAWFUL DETAINER STUDY 1991 (1991), cited
in Gerchick, supra note 8, at 794.
239. Gerchick, supra note 8, at 794 n.126.
240. See discussion supra Part VI.B.1. Filing a frivolous case as a means of delay could also
form the basis for sanctions analogous to those possible under federal Rule 11. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 11(b)(1)-(2), (c).
241. Recall that one reason for making the tenant’s prima facie case detailed and difficult
to prove is to deter abuse by tenants and to protect landlords from being unnecessarily drawn
into court. See discussion supra Part VI.A.2.
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seeking to delay their proper evictions and would impose no great burden on
landlords even if used unwisely as a delay tactic.
VIII. Conclusion
The summary eviction courts were created to preserve the interests of both
landlords and tenants; however, the daily operation of these courts provides
little protection to tenants who are the potential victims of retaliatory evictions.
These are tenants who in good faith have sought to improve their living
conditions through reasonable and protected methods, and as a result are
suffering from legitimate fears of a landlord’s impending retaliatory action.
Such tenants deserve the ability to bring a summary preliminary injunction
action in the efficient and accessible summary eviction courts. Allowing
tenants to bring such actions would relieve much of the fear and intimidation
many tenants face and would promote the important policies underlying
retaliatory eviction law, while not overburdening landlords. Summary eviction
courts should be opened to plaintiff-tenants to provide them greater protections
against retaliatory eviction.
Lauren A. Lindsey

